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Stephani: Symposium Introduction

INTRODUCTION
SYMPOSIUM: THE VARIETIES OF
THERAPEUTIC EXPERIENCE
A.J. Stephani'
Any symposium that boldly borrows from such an
estimable work as William James' The Varieties of Religious
Experience2 for its title shoulders a heavy burden. For many,
James' monumental and elegant text epitomizes the fruits of crossdisciplinary inquiry: his pivotal synthesis of psychological insight
and spiritual reflection represents perhaps the single most defining
moment in the psychology of religion.
In this, the 1 0 0 th anniversary of James' watershed work, it
is fitting that a symposium representing the breadth of the field of
legal inquiry known as "therapeutic jurisprudence" bask in its
legacy. Although TJ, as it is colloquially known, is still in its
relative infancy-the framework was developed by progenitors
David Wexler and Bruce Winick a mere 15 years ago -it shares
many of the same characteristics as James' pluralistic exposition.
However, it is critical that the analogy to James' work not be taken
too literally-in no way do I want to imply that TJ necessarily has
anything to do with "religion," "religious experience," or any
concept of "spirituality," however construed. Instead, the relevance
of James' work to TJ lies in his embrace of the importance of
subjective experience in understanding what "religion" is and his
concomitant rejection of the idea that a purely rational theory of
scientific objectivism could monopolize religious truth.
Executive Director, Glenn Weaver Institute of Law and Psychiatry,
University of Cincinnati College of Law and Convenor, Second International
Conference on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Cincinnati, Ohio, 2001.
2 WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (MacMillan
1990).
3The origin of the term "therapeutic jurisprudence" is derived from an National
Institute of Mental Health workshop in October 1987, at which David Wexler
presented a paper laying out a perspective of "law as therapy" that he termed

"juridical psychotherapy."

David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic

Jurisprudence.:From Theory to Practice,68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691, 693 (1999). As
recounted by Wexler, that term did not survive the feedback presented at the
meeting, and the term "therapeutic jurisprudence" was substituted. Id.
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Accordingly, James' work is seen within a tradition of pragmatism,
or prudentialism as it is sometimes known in its legal form. It is
within this particular tradition that I believe TJ will ultimately
reside and inspire its most productive work and thus share a place
with James and The Varieties of Religious Experience. I believe
that you will find the articles presented here with characteristic
Jamesian elegance and that the substance of the symposium lives
up to the promise of its title.
The reference to James' classic work is not simply a clever
attempt to draw attention to the diversity of therapeutic
jurisprudence scholarship, though I hope it accomplishes this
objective. It also represents a rather simplified attempt to place TJ
within a broader jurisprudential and philosophical tradition.
Although TJ is still viewed in some quarters as a strand of mental
health law scholarship,4 there is little question that the kinds of
questions TJ seek to raise have been applied in a broad range of
legal settings, many of which are exemplified in this symposium.
There have been virtually no attempts to situate TJ within a
particular jurisprudential tradition, 5 and serious attention to this
question requires far more space than a symposium introduction
will allow and a far greater faculty and knowledge of the various
jurisprudential traditions than I possess. However, I would like to
offer some rather general non-footnoted observations on the
subject and the possible linkages between TJ and the role of
William James' text in a broader context.
What began largely as an outgrowth of mental health law
discourse has blossomed, as hoped and expected by co-progenitors
David Wexler and Bruce Winick, into a therapeutic perspective on
the law in general. Articles incorporating therapeutic jurisprudence
principles have been published on topics as diverse as the role of
4See Elyn R. Saks, Mental Health Law: Three Scholarly Traditions,74 S. CA.

L. REv. 295, 298-300 (2000).
5Id. at 299-300 ("And without [a] normative orientation, one wonders what is
jurisprudential about therapeutic jurisprudence"); see also Christopher Slobogin,
TherapeuticJurisprudence:Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 193, 219 (1995) ("These suggestions, or others like them, are needed to
goad therapeutic jurisprudence into a critical self-consciousness"); id. at 199
("[O]ne needs to consider the relationship of TJ to other modem jurisprudences,
such as critical legal studies, the feminist movement, and critical race theory").
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apology in the law, 6 the therapeutic impact of sexual predator
commitment laws, 7 adoption alternatives, 8 and the therapeutic role
of the unconscionability doctrine in contract law. 9 The expansion
of TJ into areas outside of mental health law has raised questions0
concerning exactly what is meant by the term "therapeutic."'
Thus far, however, TJ has resisted attempts to adopt a rigid
formulation of the concept, opting instead for a general conception
that allows "commentators to roam within the intuitive and
common sense contours of the concept."'"
One can see in this last quote echoes of James'
circumscription of the subject matter of his own work-"Religion,
therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us
the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their
solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to
whatever they may consider the divine."' 12 Much in the same way
that TJ has recognized that unnecessary definitional constraint may
6 Daniel

W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180

(2000).
7 Sarah E. Spierling, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key: How
Washington's Violent Sexual Predator Law Will Shape the Future Balance
Between Punishment and Prevention, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 879 (2001); Keri A.
Gould, If It's a Duck and Dangerous--PermanentlyClip Its Wings or Treat it
Till it Can Fly?: A TherapeuticPerspectiveon Difficult Decisions, Short Sighted
Solutions and Violent Sexual PredatorsAfter Kansas v. Hendricks, 31 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 859 (1998); Robert F. Schopp, Civil Commitment and Sexual Predators:
Competence and Condemnation, 4 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 323 (1998); Robert
F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health System:
Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, I PSYCH. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 161-92 (1995); John Q. La Fond, Can TherapeuticJurisprudenceBe
Normatively Neutral? Sexual PredatorLaws: Their Impact on Participantsand
Policy, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 375 (1999).
8 Susan L. Brooks, The Case for Adoption Alternatives, 39 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 43 (2001).
9Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality,Contract, and Unconscionability,35
WM. & MARY L. REv. 445-501 (1994).
10See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 200-204; id. at 201 ("Whereas the words
therapeutic and well-being may be specific enough to help differentiate TJ from
other perspectives, they are still extremely vague. At least some effort must be
made to identify the meaning of these terms if this jurisprudence is to be
critically evaluated.").
11David Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1
PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 220, 221 (1995).
12JAMES, supra note 1, at 36.
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imperil its greatest promise-particular TJ-inspired insights into
how the law may maximize psychological well-being across all
legal doctrines-James understood that "the oversimplification of
[theoretical] materials ... is the root of all that absolutism and onesided dogmatism by which both philosophy and religion have been
infected., 13 A rigid definition of "therapeutic" may be useful in
determining what TJ is not, much like a tighter definition of
"religion" may have allowed James to escape some of the trickier
features of his theory, but it would neither accurately describe the
uniqueness and complexity of any endeavor involving human
interaction nor permit its greatest possible application across all
areas of legal study.
James' most significant contribution to a phenomenology
of religion, however, is his rejection of a rationalist objectivist
philosophy to explain the nature of religious objects or states of
mind. To James, "[k]nowledge about a thing is not the thing
itself."' 14 Religion is not defined by, nor does it take place in,
churches, synagogues, or other houses of worship, but felt and
experienced in everyday life. One can no more understand religion
by looking at specific doctrines or observing religious rituals than
one can understand what it is like to be drunk by knowing
the
5
causes of drunkenness, to borrow James' own analogy.'
A science might come to understand everything
about the causes and elements of religion, and
might even decide which elements were qualified,
by their general harmony with other branches of
knowledge, to be considered true; and yet the best
man at this science might be the man who found it
hardest to be personally devout .... Knowledge
about life is one thing; effective occupation of a
place in life, with its dynamic currents passing
through your being, is another. 16
James' embrace of pragmatism, a non-abstract method of
deriving truth from actual experience, is central to his
" Id. at 32.
14

Id. at 438.

15id.
16 id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss3/3

4

Stephani: Symposium Introduction

2002

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

439

understanding of religion. The legal branch of that philosophical
tradition, sometimes called prudentialism, is the tradition within
which some of the greatest 2 0 th century jurists and legal thinkersOliver Wendell Holmes, Jerome Frank, Karl Llewelyn, Alexander
Bickel-have been historically placed, and the tradition that acts as
a counterpoint to logical positivism and legal scientific realism.
I believe that it is within this pragmatic, prudentialist
tradition that any "grand theory" of TJ ultimately lies. Through its
virtual insistence that it maintain a neutral stance within any
particular doctrinal framework, TJ scholarship forces itself to
evaluate the experiential aspects of legal practice within that
framework. By remaining normatively agnostic, it requires its
proponents to explore the ways in which a thoroughgoing
understanding of the values and social policies underlying a
particular legal doctrine are, in fact, not the legal doctrine itself,
but merely the object of the doctrine. TJ, with its insights into how
the doctrine is experienced and perceived in real life, is needed to
complete the picture.
Most of the articles in this symposium were originally
presented at the Second International Conference on Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, hosted by the Glenn Weaver Institute of Law and
Psychiatry and the University of Cincinnati College of Law in May
2001, and the works by Nathalie Des Rosiers and Jim Zion were
initially presented as keynote presentations. The Conference,
which was attended by almost 200 participants, followed up on the
First International Conference on Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
which was held at the University of Southampton in Winchester,
The Conference continued the
England, in July 1998.
interdisciplinary and international interest in the area, as it featured
nearly 70 presentations by speakers from all over the world from
the disciplines of social work, nursing, counseling, criminology
and criminal justice, psychology, psychiatry, and law. In addition
to the articles presented here, four other symposia of papers
presented at the Conference are being published in the Criminal
Law Bulletin, the University of Cincinnati Law Review, the
Journal of Nursing and Law, and the Florida Coastal Law Journal.
In the first piece, Nathalie Des Rosiers discusses the
possible ways in which the therapeutic jurisprudence enterprise
may be significant in law reform generally. The essence of her
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argument-that the "'law as lived' must be the focus of the law
reform inquiry" I- stands squarely in the pragmatist and
prudentialist tradition of Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and more
remotely, William James. Her insight that the business of law
reform must look beyond a simple rights-based approach and
involve a broader spectrum of participants provides a brilliant
example of the future of therapeutic jurisprudence within a
prudentialist tradition and its impact on legal practice and
scholarship.
In the next article, Marla Kahn draws upon her background
as a psychotherapist and a lawyer to discuss the ways in which
role-interest conflicts, relational dynamics, and intrapsychic
dynamics by lawyers, judges, and other law-related personnel may
affect their legal practice and the emotional impact on their clients
and other persons involved in the legal system. By drawing
analogies to professional psychology, Kahn's work echoes James'
by emphasizing the need to minimize the distortions produced by a
lack of self-awareness and understanding of the experiential nature
of lawyer-client relations.
I am very grateful to TJ progenitors David Wexler and
Bruce Winick for providing the next article in the symposium. In
the article, Wexler and Winick discuss the growing symbiosis
between TJ and the drug court movement and the possibilities for
facilitating the rehabilitative process for drug and alcohol
offenders. An understanding of the ways in which TJ may enhance
the therapeutic potential of drug courts provides a perfect
illustration of the doctrinal normative-neutrality of therapeutic
jurisprudence. By focusing on the "experiential" aspects of drug
court programs-the judge-defendant interaction, the effect of
legal coercion of treatment effectiveness, the participation of
defense counsel within an overall "team" approach-Wexler and
Winick implicitly note the limitations of viewing drug court
exclusively through a political or doctrinal lens.
In the next piece, Robert Madden and Raymie Wayne take
up the task, only hinted at in this introduction, of attempting to
place TJ within a normative framework. Arguing that a structure
similar to the one developed in social work would meet TJ's needs,
17

Nathalie Des Rosiers, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law Reform,

infra at 446.
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the authors describe how such a framework could provide the
adaptability seemingly required by the movement. Although many
of the values espoused by the field of social work and described in
the article are non-experiential in nature, Madden and Wayne
create an implicit link with James' non-rational approach by noting
the relational and sometimes transformative nature of social work:
"To achieve these benefits the social worker must attend to the
process, not merely the outcome."' 8 This is a characteristic insight
found throughout TJ-inspired scholarship and James' work.
Yuval Feldman continues the symposium by taking up the
daunting task of describing TJ's potential significance in the law
and economics movement by examining the concept of personal
control as it relates to the freedom of contract. His insight that
"every discipline within the law should receive distinct treatment,
which takes into account the normative assumptions of the specific
doctrines"' 9 and subsequent critique that TJ, as it currently stands,
"does not consider situational constraints, and therefore does not
account for the uniqueness of every legal doctrine," 20 should be
considered carefully not only for TJ's potential applicability to
contract law, but across all legal domains. Nonetheless, Feldman's
primary contention, as I understand it, is that under whatever rubric
it is explicated, the emotional and cognitive aspects of contract
formation, such as emotional control, sense of security, and the
subjective experience of contract formation in and of itself, are
crucial considerations in resolving the narrow question of the
freedom to contract and the broader question of the role of law and
economics generally.
The final piece in the symposium is a challenging and
fascinating work by Jim Zion entitled Navajo Therapeutic
Jurisprudence. Zion leads us on a journey through indigenous
legal and cultural practices in an attempt to relate the therapeutic
jurisprudence movement to a variety of Navajo traditions and
practices. Although the work deserves far more serious
18Robert Madden & Raymie Wayne, Constructing a Normative Framework
for TherapeuticJurisprudence Using Social Work Principles as a Model, infra
at 497-98.
19Yuval Feldman, Control or Security: A Therapeutic Approach to the
Freedom
of Contract,infra at 545.
20
Id.
at 546.
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contemplation by scholars more versed in Native American
practices, I was fascinated by the recurring themes of relationship,
narrative, and context-ideas that play a critical role both in
William James' work on spiritual phenomenology and in a legal
prudentialist tradition. Hopefully, we can use Zion's work as an
invitation to explore Native American ideas such as k'e 21 and their
potential impact on legal practice.
I hope you enjoy the articles presented here-they truly
reflect the breadth and diversity of the therapeutic jurisprudence
enterprise. On behalf of the Steering Committee for the
Conference, I would like to thank the several boards of the Touro
Law Review for their enduring patience, cooperation, and
enthusiasm in publishing these articles.

21 See

James W. Zion, Navajo TherapeuticJurisprudence,infra at 604-06.
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